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Organisational learning in the EU’s multilevel governance system 
 
 
Adriaan Schout 
 
 
 
The EU’s governance reform does not match the expectations of its promoters; the 
‘new’ instruments seem to under-perform. One explanation, explored here, is that 
governance has been discussed without much attention for capacities at the operational 
level. Analyses are needed of how instruments are used and designed within the EU’s 
multilevel administrative system. To move from governance to capacities, three 
interrelated levels of learning are distinguished to examine whether changes in 
governance are supported by developments in organisational capacities: ‘governance 
learning’, ‘instrument learning’ and ‘organisational learning’. One hypothesis is that 
these need to develop simultaneously. The second hypothesis is that, in the EU's 
multilevel administration, learning along these dimensions has to take place in parallel 
at EU and national levels. This article analyses the capacities which the Commission 
and the Netherlands have created to support the better regulation agenda. It concludes 
a match between the three levels of learning in the Commission but a mismatch 
between learning in the Commission and the Netherlands. This multilevel mismatch 
may help to explain the lack of success of the EU’s better regulation agenda. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Essentially, the learning literature underlines that politics is more than  a conflict and a 
struggle for power. Politics also involves dealing with uncertainty, gathering and processing 
information and building new structures (Bennett and Howlett 1992). The learning 
perspectives point towards the dynamic changes in the contexts in which the power struggles 
take place and underline that policy making can be more than zero-sum games.  
 
The EU governance literature more or less assumes a ‘governance turn’ (Kohler-Koch and 
Rittberger 2006) and hence presumes that policy making in the EU has been lifted to a higher 
level by moving away from (‘hierarchical’) legislation towards networked governance. In the 
governance literature, hierarchical norm setting, which has been the EU’s preferred mode of 
governance, is regarded as a zero-sum game in which sectors and Member States fight over 
static obligations (e.g. over the percentage of waste recycling). Instead, ‘new’ modes of 
governance based on communication and networks are hoped to offer win-win situations 
through interactive processes in which objectives are identified  and problems solved 
(Kooiman 2003). But is this what has happened? Moreover, has the ‘governance turn’ 
delivered on its promises and if not, why not?  
 
Current reviews of EU governance show, firstly, that there has not been so much of a shift 
from legislation to new instruments and, secondly, that the results of new instruments fall 
behind expectations (Citi and Rhodes 2007, TEP 2007, Kurpas et al. 2008, Eberlein and 
Newman 2008, Schout and Jordan 2008). However, equating the governance debate with a   3
shift to ‘new’ instruments does not do justice to the governance reforms and the attempt to 
upgrade quality of legislation. This article argues that to understand the state of play in the 
governance reforms and the disappointing evaluations, we have to take a much closer look at 
what has happened in terms of instruments. In order to understand governance, we need to 
look behind the instruments and examine the changes at the “shop floor” of the administrative 
systems (Hanf 1994). 
  
To see how governance has changed and where things may have become stuck, we 
distinguish three levels in the governance debate: governance learning, instrument learning 
and organisational learning. In learning terms, the governance ‘turn’ suggests nothing less 
than a shift in paradigm in the EU’s preferred steering modes, i.e. in preferences for broad 
categories of governance instruments (Lascoumes and Legales 2007). This paradigm shift is 
referred to here in the context of the EU’s governance debate as ‘governance learning’ and is 
defined as learning about the major governance modes and how they can be employed 
effectively. It involves ‘instrument learning’, defined as the development in instruments and 
entailing lessons about the viability of the individual policy instruments (May 1992: 332). 
Accounting for the performance of particular instruments requires access to the operational 
details. It is at this level of organisational learning that we can see whether governance has 
changed and where we can find explanations for performance. 
 
The organisational learning literature is rich, examining sociological aspects, information 
technology, leadership and processes (Easterby-Smith and Lyles 2003; Common 2004). The 
definition of organisational learning used here follows Common’s (2004): “making practical 
use of … knowledge to achieve particular government objectives, usually accompanied by 
organisational change” (p. 36). This definition relates to the organisational science literature 
studying capacities for information gathering, lowering coordination costs, and steering the 
behaviour of individuals and groups (Cyert and March 1963). Organisational learning takes 
place when organisations develop structures and procedures (‘capacities’ as elaborated below) 
to upgrade information processing and improve problem solving (Olsen and Peters 1996).  
 
Organisational learning supports the effectiveness and efficiency of policy making but there is 
not a one-to-one relation between organisational learning and policy making given the many 
intervening variables (personalities, political realities, values) which influence adaptation 
processes (Zito and Schout 2009). Moreover, not all organisational adaptation is learning. 
Some learning can even be damaging when capacities to solve problems and process 
information are in fact disrupted. For example, New Public Management reforms have been 
criticised for increasing fragmentation (Bouckaert and Pollitt 2004). Hence, interpretations of 
the adaptations will always be necessary. 
 
Of the different learning approaches, organisational learning is probably the least developed. 
The different views on the usefulness of the ‘hard’ organisational aspects in relation to more 
political views on organisations partly explain this lacuna (Dawson 1992; Rhodes 1997). 
Quite typically, Easterby-Smith and Lyles (2003), who utilise organisational learning, 
emphasise ‘process’ and ‘power’. Important as these perspectives are, they need not deny the 
relevance of organisational capacities such as rule systems, resources and coordination 
mechanisms.  
 
By distinguishing three layers of learning, this paper analyses the match between changes in 
governance and the redesign of administrations. For reasons discussed below, in the context 
of the EU’s multilevel administration this match has to be analysed in at least two ways. The   4
innovations in the use of instruments at EU level have to be matched by developments in 
administrative capacities in the EU institutions. Secondly, the capacities that are being built at 
the EU level require parallel adaptations in the national administrations. Organisational 
learning offers an approach to study the development of organisational capacities and to 
compare these between levels of administration.  
 
As case study, we take impact assessments (IA). Being the key component in the EU’s better 
regulation (BR) policy, IA should lead to better argued policies in terms of objectives such as 
consequences for the environment and for administrative costs, and to a careful selection of 
instruments (see Radaelli, this volume). Yet, after 15 years of experimenting with different 
types of assessments, the evaluations are still lukewarm (EVIA 2008). There are several 
explanations for this and the paper argues that multilevel organisational design issues are part 
of them. This case study is part of a wider research studying the administrative challenges of 
the governance debate (anonymous 2008).  
 
Section Two defines organisational learning and discusses the links between learning at 
governance, instrument and organisational levels. This leads to a model to operationalise and 
assess organisational learning. Placing this study in the context of EU governance as a multi-
layered learning challenge, Section Three moves from the higher level of abstraction (the 
EU’s governance debate) to a specific, relatively new instrument in the EU (impact 
assessments). The subsequent Sections explore the development of organisational capacities 
in the Commission (Four) and the Netherlands (Five). Given obvious difficulties of multilevel 
organisational studies, this article only discusses the Commission (the EU level) and the 
Netherlands (as a sample of the Council). This offers a reasonable flavour of EU 
organisational learning dilemmas. The Dutch government is an obvious candidate as it has 
invested heavily in BR and has been presented as a world leader (World Bank 2007). 
Moreover, the Dutch are acutely aware of the need for further EU steps to ensure better 
policies nationally. The case of the Netherlands, being a leader in assessments (Radaelli, this 
volume), raises the question of whether, if they have difficulty in matching capacities to 
policy innovations, IAs feasible in the EU? The conclusions follow in Section Six. 
 
For the information on how IA systems are structured and used, this article draws on reports 
and on interviews with officials at the Commission (Directorate Generals (DGs) and 
Secretariat General (SG)), the European Parliament (administrators and MEPs) and the 
General Secretariat of the Council, as well as with officials at various Dutch ministries and at 
the independent watchdog for administrative burden (ACTAL). Two senior officials from the 
Dutch administration and the Commission have read earlier drafts and have confirmed the 
findings. 
 
2 Levels of learning in the EU governance debate 
 
Differentiating three levels of learning helps to position organisational learning in the EU 
governance debate (Table 1). The first level is governance learning. At the highest level of 
abstraction, governance is about broad steering modes originally summarized in the literature 
as ‘markets and hierarchies’ but developed into ‘markets, networks and hierarchies’ when 
networks became fashionable (Powell 1990). The governance debate marks a shift from 
government (‘hierarchy’ or legislation as understood in the EU governance debate, Héritier 
and Lehmkuhl 2008) to governance through interactions within networks (‘processes’, 
Kooiman 2003) and economic incentives (‘markets’). Governance learning may involve   5
improvements in the existing mode or a ‘turn’ towards another mode. To be complete, 
governance learning includes increasing insights in instruments and their designs but the 
levels are treated separately for heuristic reasons. 
 
>>>>Table 1<<<< 
 
The second level relates to the instruments related to the governance modes. Moving from the 
higher level of abstraction of governance to instruments immediately points to some 
confusion as ‘markets’, ‘networks’ and ‘hierarchies’ are not broad categories but instruments. 
Knill and Lenschow (2005) therefore use the broader labels of competition, communication 
and coercion (Table 1).  
 
Although the EU governance debate focuses on the broadening out of instruments from 
legislation towards network-based modes and incentive-based mechanisms such as tax 
measures (Jordan, Wurzel and Zito 2003), governance is mainly discussed in relation to 
networked-based instruments such as OMC, impact assessments (EVIA 2008), and agencies 
and their networks (Majone 1996; Monda et al. forthcoming). The EU has seized on networks 
to circumvent or complement legislation. ‘Networked governance’ is a system where 
governments are “dependent upon the cooperation and joint resource mobilization of policy 
actors outside their hierarchical control” (Börzel 1998: 260). Moreover, networks may nurture 
a greater sense of ownership for horizontal objectives such as subsidiarity, competitiveness, 
regulatory quality and sustainability and allow flexibility in the post-enlargement era 
(CEC2002a, 2002b; anonymous 2005). 
 
Linking governance to instruments is however not straightforward. In reality, the modes are 
interconnected. OMC may not mean less legislation and legislation may be part of the move 
towards networked-governance (Héritier and Lehmkuhl 2008). Moreover, markets are 
complex systems which cannot be seen independently from hierarchical regulation or 
networks (Powell 1990). The modes need several or even all of the instruments but in 
different formats. Markets as well as soft coordination need laws but in specific forms and 
with different functions (laws as rules guiding market interactions or as sticks behind OMC 
processes). Impact assessments can be seen as ways to improve hierarchical governance but 
can also be employed as a network type of steering. Similarly, agencies can support 
hierarchical legislation by providing better information but it can also be part of networked 
governance. EU agencies are organised differently when supporting the Commission in law 
making, compared to EU agencies facilitating interactions between social partners (Monda et 
al. forthcoming). Confusion arises when agencies are presented as governance innovation in 
the form of independent authorities whereas their design offers the Commission tight controls 
on agencies with a view to supporting the traditional Community method (anonymous 
forthcoming). Hence, to understand shifts in governance it is essential to see how instruments 
are designed.  
 
By the same token, the design has to be in accordance with the governance objectives. For 
example, if a network has to foster cooperation between energy regulators then we need to see 
whether it is granted sufficient powers and resources to do so (Coen and Thatcher 2008). 
Reviews are now emerging on the outcomes of new instruments which show mixed 
assessments of their achievements. While there are successes to report (e.g. Dehousse 2004; 
Knill and Lenschow 2005; Gornitzka 2006) many studies drawn critical conclusions (Citi and 
Rhodes 2007; anonymous 2008). New governance instruments do not seem to work as hoped   6
as underlined by the critical assessments of impact assessments (TEP 2007; EVIA 2008), 
networks (Eberlein and Newman 2008, Coen and Thatcher 2008) and agencies (CEC2008). 
Several explanations have been explored for the levelling off of performance including 
unrealistic expectations, the lack of leadership, the suitability of administrative cultures, the 
differentiation between the administrations and functional difficulties (OMC threatens 
harmonisation, Holzinger et al. 2006). Organisational learning has received hardly any 
attention (Bressers and Hanf 1995; Lascoumes and Le Gales 2007). 
 
Unpacking organisational learning 
Lascoumes and Le Gales (2007 p.2) conclude that instruments are generally seen in a 
functionalist way and treated as “natural” and as being “at our disposal” – suggesting that all 
that needs to be considered is what the best instruments are to meet objectives. These authors 
note that policy makers think that by changing the instruments they change the world (p. 6) 
but the results generated by the EU’s new instruments show that this has not been the case 
(Citi and Rhodes 2007). Hence, broadening the governance tools neither implies automatic 
changes in governance nor success. Exploring the details of how instruments are shaped and 
used in the EU is now beginning to be explored (Kassim and Le Gales 2009). 
 
Studying organisational learning requires a model to operationalise administrative capacities. 
The basis of any organisation is the definition of the unit structure and of the coordination 
mechanisms that glue it together (‘differentiation and integration’, Lawrence and Lorsch 
1967). The workload involved in designing and using EU instruments imposes a need for the 
coordination capacities in the Commission and national administrations to be efficient (for 
details: anonymous 2005). 
 
The organisational literature discusses mechanisms through which information is gathered, 
shared and problems are solved. Borrowing from Mintzberg’s synthesis (1979), different 
types of coordination mechanisms can be distinguished. These capacities influence the 
coordination costs and cooperation in the organisation.  As with all governance mechanisms, 
these are mutually reinforcing (Rhodes 1997):  
-  Hierarchical coordination – defined here as the supervision by the political apex. In 
practice, there is only so much the hierarchy can supervise so that contributions from the 
hierarchy often take the form of mission statements (e.g. “ensure early coordination” of 
impact assessments (CEC2009)). The starting point of any administrative study is the political 
commitment but amidst other objectives and dynamics this can, in practice, be more symbolic 
than real (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).  
-  Bureaucratic capacities (roles, rules, procedures, guidelines and resources) reduce 
transaction costs by making information exchanges cheap and reliable and by defining the 
margins of manoeuvre. They help define who has the right to information and take decisions.  
-  Standardisation of objectives involves setting clear and measurable objectives to allow 
decentralisation. Management by objectives is an essential new public management technique 
but has proven to be hard to apply in the public sector (Bouckaert and Pollitt 2004). This form 
of standardisation is closely linked to divisionalisation as it makes divisions (‘DGs’ in public 
sector terminology) responsible for reaching targets. In terms of organisational capacities it 
implies that DGs have their own units not just for implementing the policies but also for 
monitoring the achievements. In terms of the BR discussion below, if DGs are made 
responsible for impact assessments they would need to set up units in which IA expertise is 
combined and where assessments are monitored. In addition, the apex has to have a unit to   7
monitor whether targets are being met also with a view to creating commitment to these 
targets. 
- Training  (professionalisation)  influences working methods, culture or objectives. 
Training – e.g. on how to use IAs - is probably most used in reform programmes as it fairly 
straightforward to apply. 
-  Horizontal coordination mechanisms unload hierarchical structures and allow richer 
and more flexible communications. They include informal contacts, task forces at the 
operating core, teams and integrating managers. Teams are committees at a higher level with 
a broad overview and able to resolve conflicts. Integrators are the chairs of the teams and have 
potentially weaker (mediating) or stronger (decision taking) powers. Using the IA example, 
assessments will require task forces combining information from different fields as well as 
teams to solve problem and take decisions. 
 
This model makes it possible to assess and compare organisational learning in the EU's 
multilevel administrative system (Table 1, third column). As a hypothesis, the introduction of 
new instruments requires careful attention for each of these capacities. Moreover, if we know 
how instruments are designed and whether there is a match between instrumental learning and 
organisational learning, then we know whether governance learning has taken place and in 
which direction (reinforcement of existing governance mechanisms or a shift in mode of 
governance).  
 
Evidently, there is no automatic link between changes in the use of instruments and 
organisational redesign. Explanations for discongruencies are many and include the resilience 
of organisations (Zito and Schout 2009). Moreover, not all reforms in relation to new 
instruments will be an improvement. The Commission interviews show that officials are not 
necessarily experienced in thinking through how changes in instruments should be 
complemented with organisational changes and they may fear design questions particularly 
when it involves obligations on other DGs. Hence, organisational learning should not be 
simply assumed. With this model we can at least analyse change in capacities and discuss 
their effects. 
 
3 Better Regulation as governance learning and instrument learning 
 
Has there been a governance turn? Apparently the direction of governance learning was 
undecided for some time. While academic literature focused on open coordination, the 
Commission’s official line favoured clearer legislation (CEC2001a). Yet, the EU was 
increasingly active in, often Council driven, OMC projects such as ‘Lisbon’. Current reviews 
show that the Commission’s output has not really changed. Legislative output hardly 
diminished and soft instruments have not really increased (Kurpas et al. 2008). Nevertheless, 
a more complementary use of instruments have can be concluded as result of a broadened 
instrumental toolkit with agencies, networks and OMCs (Treib et al. 2007). 
 
Although no paradigm shift, there has been governance learning in particularly as a result of 
the BR agenda (Radaelli, this volume). BR, particularly due to the IA system, has resulted in 
better argued Commission proposals and a “change in culture” (according to several 
interviews) from DGs working independently towards cooperation. What started out as a 
variety of objectives cherished by different DGs (sustainable development, reduction of 
administrative costs, gender equality), a series of unrelated IA systems developed by different   8
DGs and a search for ‘good governance’ by the SG (related to among others exploring new 
instruments) has resulted in IA system in which these objectives are integrated (Allio 2008). 
 
Radaelli (2007 191) defines better regulation as “a type of meta-regulation because of its 
emphasis on standards and rules which, instead of governing  specific sectors or economic 
actors, steer the process of rule formulation, adoption, enforcement, and evaluation”. An 
interviewee referred to it simply as a “policy policy”. With the integrated impact assessment 
as a core instrument, the lines between governance and BR faded. The BR agenda now 
comprise a range of objectives including subsidiarity, proportionality, providing empirical 
proof for policies, sustainability, reducing administrative burdens by 25%, priority setting and 
using the least disruptive instruments (such as OMCs and voluntary agreements). These are 
now well founded in the Commission’s IA system (CEC2002b, 2009) and resulted in a 
Common Approach with the European Parliament and the Council on better law-making 
(CEC2006) with which the EU Institutions committed “themselves to take the IAs of the 
Commission into full account” and to carry out assessments of substantial amendments. 
 
BR is a political spearhead on the EU agenda equal to the ‘1992’ programme or the Lisbon 
processes. With the ‘completion’ of the internal market, BR has emerged as the priority in the 
post-Delors era of ‘less but better’ (Peterson 2008). Having figured on top of the Commission 
and Council agendas for some time (Radaelli and De Francesco 2007), the hierarchical 
commitment is beyond doubt. Underscoring the political commitment, assessment systems are 
now increasingly organised in units closely connected to the political apex of the Commission 
and national administrations (EVIA 2008).  
 
Superficially, one can see the IA as a tool to arrive at better legislation but, more 
fundamentally, BR can be seen as part of a process of depoliticisation or scientification of 
politics (Everson and Vos 2008). The elaboration of instruments, such as agencies, 
consultation of independent experts and IAs, increasingly bind the hands of politicians. The 
use of regular independent evaluations of policies and sunset clauses also underlines this 
trend. Hence, BR alters the nature of EU governance more fundamentally than the stability in 
use of instruments suggests. Hence, some form of paradigmatic shift has taken place in the 
sense of better argumentation of policies and instruments.  
 
Nevertheless, the implementation of the assessment systems has remained problematic. The 
Commission’s efforts to create an IA system offer an example of more than 15 years of trials 
and errors, evaluations and reformulations. The latest ‘integrated impact assessment’ system 
has already also gone through several reviews and modifications (TEP 2007, CEC2009). 
Comparisons to earlier evaluations of European IA systems reveal persistent problems 
(Wilkinson 1995; Kraemer et al. 2002) such as: 
-  Postponement of assessments until proposals are nearly finalised. 
-  Lack of assessments of alternatives. 
-  Difficulty in gathering data. 
-  Lack of political commitment (MEPs and ministers in the Council) to actually pursue 
the assessment methodology throughout the negotiations. 
-  Lack of horizontal and vertical coordination mechanisms needed for integrated 
assessments. 
 
Yet, Commission officials were positive about the influence of the assessments on policy 
making because there is now more internal cooperation. Also MEPs underlined in interviews 
that they consider Commission proposals as being better argued and offering better   9
information why one alternative was chosen compared to others. On the whole, the interviews 
underline changes in the Commission proposals but also expressed doubts as to whether the 
assessments make a difference in the final outcomes. Summarising, there are major 
instrumental developments but their performance has continued to be mediocre (EVIA 2008).  
 
4 Organisational learning in the Commission 
 
Integrated BR ambitions assume that the Commission is able to coordinate in order to deliver 
proposals that are sustainable, respect ambitions of minimum administrative burdens etc. This 
contrasts sharply with the Commission’s reputation for being internally fragmented 
(Mandelkern 2001: 64). Policy making was an informal process where officials – often in 
cooperation with the Cabinets – worked in relative isolation from other Commission units. 
The Commission work programme as such was long and rather noncommittal. Programme 
items could easily be ignored while proposals not in the programme were pursued. An 
interviewee suggested that sometimes items were left outside the programme to shield them 
from colleagues. Acknowledging that large organisations will be hard to reform, BR may not 
have been much more than symbolic politics. 
 
However, the BR agenda coincided almost by accident with the Kinnock reforms which 
resulted in a rather successful reform of the Commission (Peterson 2008). The Commission 
introduced a system of Activity Based Management together with the Strategic Planning and 
Programming Cycle (SPP) to focus activities and resources (Table 2). With a view to 
reinforcing the BR agenda in its work planning, the Legal Service was involved at an earlier 
stage. Moreover, IAs became an obligatory step in the legislative process (CEC2006). To 
include a legislative proposal in the work programme, it had to be complemented by at least 
an initial assessment (‘roadmap’), and all legislation going to the College for a decision has to 
include a full IA. Hence, the Kinnock reforms resulted in an overhaul of policy planning in 
which the IA - and the objectives it embodies on better regulation – was incorporated. In 
addition, DGs have reserved resources in their work plans for the use of consultants to carry 
out IAs and the use of consultants is regulated by guidelines incorporated in the IA system. 
Consultants can gather information but should not write the proposal and DGs must have to 
give them clear questions. These measures have resulted in new rules and organisational roles 
and therefore implied a much-needed bureaucratisation (Table 2).  
 
This bureaucratisation – in the positive sense - of planning has been reinforced by the 
elaboration of the position of the SG. Originally, the SG was never as powerful as the 
nationally appointed Commissioners who exercised strong control over ‘their’ DGs. It 
operated more as a post box for the College. The SG’s horizontal authority has been greatly 
upgraded with Barroso’s more presidential style (Peterson 2008), the formalisation of the SG 
role in work planning and IAs, and its staff expansion.  
 
The Commission also established an impact assessment board (IAB) in 2006. The IAB is high 
level team to cement horizontal coordination. It monitors the development of the IAs of the 
DGs and checks the assessments when the proposal is sent to the College. The IAB comments 
are presented on the Commission website - a remarkably high level of transparency as this 
means that the Commission has opened up its internal deliberations. The Deputy-SG chairs 
the IAB, which consists of directors from: DG Employment, Social Affairs and Equal 
Opportunities; DG Economic and Financial Affairs; DG Enterprise and Industry; DG   10
Environment. The chair sees to it that the directors participate themselves to ensure the 
necessary strategic level and commitment.  
 
The IAB scrutinized about 200 proposals in 2008. The interviews indicate that the Deputy SG 
spends about 40 hours on the IAB per month on the IAs (reading the IAs and notes from his 
staff, participating in IAB meetings and when necessary meeting with the lead DGs to follow 
up the IAB report). Interviews present him as a driving force behind the IAB and its “critical” 
and “rigorous” reviews. This suggests that he is not just a mere committee chair but more of a 
forceful integrating manager. The way this position is designed close to the apex of the 
Commission and resourced contributes to the success of the IAB. The IAB’s verdict can take 
the form of approval, conditional approval, no agreement or a suspended agreement. In the 
latter case the proposal will not go to the College (unless Barroso decides otherwise). This, 
together with the openness of its comments, underlines the IAB’s procedural power (Peterson 
2008).  
 
The SG has committed approximately 8 officials for the IA related tasks: to write the 
guidelines, and be involved in the work planning and controlling of the IAs before IAB 
examination. In addition, other officials from the SG who are involved in internal policy 
coordination – approximately 40 officials - also work on assessments one way or other the 
other. They participate in the early inter-service consultations where they support the use of 
the IA guidelines and monitor the search for alternative options and instruments. Moreover, 
they ensure that the consultants are used in appropriate ways and that the final IAs adhere to 
the guidelines. 
 
The BR agenda also resulted in an external monitoring body (the Stoiber group), created in 
September 2007. Its objective is to add external political pressure and to help set priorities for 
cost reduction. This group of experts from business, environment and social organisations 
scrutinises EU policies now from an integrated perspective. It is too early to establish this 
group’s influence. Other support facilities include an internal Impact Assessment Working 
Group and an intra-Commission internet portal with practical information on conducting an 
IA (TEP 2007). 
 
The support mechanisms for the IA system include the guidelines (a bureaucratic rule system) 
which specify standards and operational procedures. Second, the Commission organises 
internal and external training seminars to broaden and professionalize the use of the IA 
system. Third, the DGs are expected to have support functions for the IAs (divisionalisation). 
Each DG has a unit or one or two experts for support and to ensure the first line of quality 
control on IAs. The TEP (2007) evaluation found that 18 out of the 21 DGs did not feel able 
to conduct or follow all relevant IAs in sufficient detail. However, this evaluation was done 
early in the establishment of the IA system. More recent interviews show that the DGs have 
continued to invest in the necessary IA structures and training.  
 
>>>>>>Table 2<<<<< 
 
 
 
In terms of organisational capacities, these measures amount to fundamental changes from 
fragmentation towards a mature bureaucracy, a reinforcement of the Commission’s 
divisionalised form and stronger horizontal coordination. These are not mere quantitative 
(‘more of the same’) but actual qualitative organisational changes.    11
 
Summarising, the developments of the Commission’s IA system is mixed. On the one hand, 
there is considerable instrument and organisational learning to report and MEPs have 
indicated that they think that the quality of Commission proposals has gone up as a result. On 
the other hand, there is still considerable reservation in the DGs to really apply the logic of the 
IAs. As the evaluations and interviews indicate, IAs have an element of window dressing by 
reserving them to the final stages and using them for clarification rather then as a tool to 
“think outside the box”. Part of the explanation can be found in the functioning of the 
Council. 
 
 
5 BR in NL – instrument and organisational learning 
 
In a multilevel system, success also depends on the capacities of ‘the’ Council. Even if the 
Commission offers an integrated proposal, the inherently fragmented Council – and EP – can 
still focus on sectoral interests without considerations to, for example, administrative costs, 
sustainability or proportionality. Moreover, if the Council does not signal to the Commission 
a desire for integrated proposals, then the Commission has fewer incentives to invest in 
horizontal BR objectives. This may offer an important explanation for the limited actual 
impact of IAs. Hence, the EU’s multilevel context requires examination of instrument and 
organisational learning in the Commission and Council as well as of the design of the 
interplay between the levels. 
 
The Netherlands has been one of the frontrunners in the EU’s BR debate, together with the 
UK and other member states (Radaelli and De Francesco 2007). This section asks whether it 
has aligned its policy and structures to those of the Commission or whether its efforts have 
been aimed mainly at uploading national objectives without considering the implications for 
its own policy and EU policy coordination? 
 
In terms of governance learning, the Dutch BR agenda has not developed in parallel with the 
EU agenda and focused heavily on deregulation (more market less hierarchy). Against the 
background of the Dutch consociational welfare state, the reform processes have concentrated 
from the early 80s onwards on reducing the size of government and market liberalisation. 
Although concerns were expressed at regular intervals to not ignore quality, BR has been 
mainly related to quantity (i.e. deregulation and assessing costs of legislation, Van Gestel and 
Hertogh 2006). The first Cabinet of Wim Kok in 1994 formulated the 10% cost reduction 
ambition. This ambition was raised to 25% (1998) and continued by the successive 
Balkenende Cabinets from 2002 onwards.  
 
The government created a structure based on a number of organisational features to support 
the 25% reduction. The World Bank (2007) presented it as “world leader” because of its clear 
and simple structure. The Dutch success stems from:  
-  Standardisation of objectives through the objective of 25% net reduction. This 
objective is distributed over the ministries so that each has a specific reduction target. 
Each ministry has set up internal contact points for burden reduction, monitoring 
progress and support. 
-  Bureaucratic rules in the form of a simple quantitative tool – the standard cost method 
– to measure the administrative burden of new proposals and independent procedural   12
control by a supervisory body (ACTAL) which reviews all legislation before it goes to 
Cabinet and parliament. Its comments are published. 
-  Political commitment and leadership of the Ministry of Finance of is created through 
integration of the 25% objective in the budget cycle. 
-  As regards capacities related to the professional organisation, ACTAL organises 
training sessions and workshops for the ministries on the application of the standard 
cost model.  
These features imply strong hierarchical steering within Cabinet, a strong bureaucratic 
procedural framework, an independent agency controlling performance, and a reinforcement 
of the divisional structure by giving ministries individual objectives (Table 3). 
 
Despite discussions on whether business actually feels any reductions and on the dangers of 
ignoring the benefits of regulation, the assessment of costs in 2002 (16,4 billion Euro) 
compared to the administrative costs in 2007 (approximately 13 billion Euro) shows that the 
25% target was almost reached. This amounts to a benefit of 3,6% of GDP (Tweede Kamer 
2006-2007, 30 800, nr. 1, 19 September). Moreover, the BR policy has contributed to a 
culture that is more conscious of the costs policies impose on business (Tweede Kamer 2006-
2007, 29515 2002; Linschoten et al. 2008). 
 
The focus on cost reduction of administrative costs and deregulation should not suggest that 
there have been no policies related to administrative quality, but this administrative burden 
programme has been the only one with a real impact. The traditionally highly fragmented 
Dutch administration (Andeweg 1988) has seen many different kinds of BR-type policies. The 
Department for Home Affairs has a programme concerning administrative burden on citizens. 
The Economic Affairs Ministry has been responsible for projects dealing with contradictory 
regulations, simplification of permits and ‘gold plating’ (adding requirements when 
implementing EU policy). The Ministry of Justice launched a framework-project aimed at 
various goals, including stimulating the use of alternative instruments. The Environment 
Ministry has been active in promoting sustainable developments tests. These programmes 
have been (much) less visible for different reasons – including lack of political backing. 
 
This system is currently being changed into an integrated system. The progress with the 25% 
operations implied that, with cost reduction on its way, new targets had to be found to keep 
the BR agenda alive. This resulted in an assessment of approaches in the various departments 
and a debate on moving towards integrated assessments. An overview of departmental efforts 
uncovered 110 tests that the departments have created. Many of these are unknown or of little 
consequence. This figure underlines the high level of administrative fragmentation of the 
Dutch BR agenda.  
 
The developments towards an integrated assessment are not very promising. An 
interministerial meeting originally set up to discuss cost reductions is trying to broaden the 
assessment system but the ministries have difficulties agreeing on an integrated system. 
Typically, the IA model now on the table assumes that departments adhere to it on a voluntary 
basis, and therefore seems to erode hierarchical coordination (Table 3). In addition, it will be 
more qualitative (eroding the management by objectives). Furthermore, it is unclear how the 
external watchdog - ACTAL – can be remodelled into an integrated set of objectives (eroding 
the bureaucratic capacities of the previous system). Hence, the design features that made the 
25% programme successful will probably cease to exist. It is too early to evaluate the newly 
emerging system, but this may be an example of learning leading to the breakdown of a rather 
successful – although one-dimensional - system.  
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With the move towards integrated assessments, the Dutch and the EU's BR agendas become 
more alike. However, instrument learning in the Netherlands does not match organisational 
learning. Capacities for burden reduction were successful but designing a system for 
integrated assessments appears to be much harder. 
 
 
>>>>>Table 3<<<<< 
 
The Dutch BR agenda and EU policy making 
Moving beyond the EU and Dutch BR agendas separately, we need to address whether the 
Dutch BR ambitions have also altered Dutch EU policy coordination. What organisational 
learning has taken place in this interface between EU policies and the definition of the 
national position at the various phases of EU policy making? Building on [Anonymous 2006], 
the administrative demands of a multilevel IA system require that the Member States 
incorporate the IA logic in the negotiations in the Council. Otherwise the Commission will get 
few incentives from the Council to perform assessments or to guard a variety of objectives 
requiring (painful) coordination between DGs. Moreover, it would be a waste of time and 
resources for the Commission if their carefully assessed proposals, in which sustainability, 
administrative costs etc. are incorporated, are watered down by the rather fragmented sectoral 
Councils. These Councils tend to focus on traditional sectoral interests without much interest 
in the broader BR agenda. Therefore, whether the BR succeeds depends also on whether the 
Councils incorporate the IA logic. This will depend on whether the Member States have 
incorporated this logic in the preparations of their national positions so that the BR logic 
incorporated in the Commission’s proposal is not ignored by the Council (and EP, see 
anonymous 2006).  
 
Moreover, the Commission will need information from Member States to produce IAs. In the 
ideal situation, national officials follow the Commission agenda and early drafting of 
proposals and IAs so that they can create impressions of how policies will affect the national 
situation in terms of subsidiarity, conditions of the environment, administrative costs, etc. 
This will also help the Commission in determining how proposals affect the Member States. 
Moreover, they should consider the consequences of the national negotiating positions in 
relation to the integrated objectives and they should ensure with their colleagues in the 
Council that major changes proposed by the Council are assessed.  In other words, the logic of 
the IAs should be part of the formulation of the national position and of the input in the 
Council.  
 
Dutch EU policy coordination has been structured on the basis of three interdepartmental 
coordination committees: BNC (committee to assess new Commission proposals), Coreper 
Instruction Meeting, and CoCo (senior coordinating committee for EU and international 
affairs more generally). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs chairs these but can only assume 
weak coordinating and arbitrating roles. In between these committees, departments cooperate 
informally or operate rather independently. The latter two committees finalise the formal 
Dutch instructions and solve problems. The BNC sets out the major lines by defining who is 
involved in the coordination and the initial perspective on a proposal (politically, financially 
and legally). It is a junior committee and located early in the Council process (when the 
Commission sends the proposal to the Council). This Committee has to present a fiche within 
6 weeks to the government summarising the proposal and the initial perspective. It has been 
the long-held objective that this committee would make Dutch EU policy coordination less   14
reactive, but given its junior nature, it has remained mainly an information exchanging body 
and with that hardly threatens the independence of departments (ROB 2004). It is quite telling 
that the BNC – which has been the Dutch hope for a more proactive and strategic EU policy 
coordination - has never been evaluated by independent experts. This compares sharply to the 
Commission’s organisational learning culture characterised by frequent evaluations. 
 
Responding to the increasing importance of BR, the fiche has been revised after drawn-out 
discussions (2007). This debate was difficult as it concerns the question about which tests 
merit the attention of the interministerial meeting. It relates to a recurring debate on questions 
in the fiche on gender equality, impact on development cooperation, sustainable development, 
etc. Ministries have developed a reflex of preventing additional questions. Nevertheless, 
discussions on the Commission’s assessment regarding information obligations and 
consequences for subsidiarity and proportionality are now incorporated in the fiche. What is 
subsequently done with the information in the fiches is difficult to determine as it only aims at 
exchanging information. Moreover, as one interviewee pointed out, the wording is often along 
the lines of ‘we took note of the Commission’s IA’. The interviews indicate that the 
discussion on assessments can sometime be serious but more often remains a box-ticking 
exercise (compare also EVIA 2008). 
 
This does not mean that the Commission’s IAs are totally uncoordinated. Some ministries, 
such as Environment and Transport, have started to take an interest in the Commission work 
programme and to create task forces (sometimes interdepartmental and with representatives 
from regional governments and NGOs) to see whether and how Commission IAs need to be 
anticipated and influenced. These developments are however still rare and very new. As far as 
the analysis allowed, only Environment has already arranged for a proactive assessment on a 
Commission proposal and is now regularly discussing with stake holders which issues on the 
Commission agenda may need particular attention.  
 
The Ministry of Finance monitors the attention for burden reduction in the preparations of the 
Dutch EU positions and can involve ACTAL to assess the costs of Commission proposals. 
Finance officials will also try to monitor the subsequent developments on the dossiers but the 
interviewees show that this ministry operates at a junior level when monitoring EU dossiers 
and that the influence is otherwise limited due to the workload involved and the knowledge 
required.  
 
This shows that the Commission’s IAs may be taken more seriously in the future and may 
lead to more and earlier interdepartmental teams to assess upcoming Commission proposals. 
But, for the time being, the actions of the Netherlands to steer the EU’s administrative burden 
policy is not matched with a strategy to also incorporate this more strongly in the day-to-day 
preparations of the negotiating positions. Neither does the value system (brain frame) seem to 
have changed. Whereas the Commission is now very concerned with proofing and evaluations 
up to the point that there are too many and too early evaluations (interviews), this quality 
control or search for proof is much less developed in the Netherlands where it concerns EU 
policies. The preparation of the Dutch positions is still oriented towards finding 
interdepartmental consensus. 
 
Confronted with the challenge of how to reinforce BR objectives in Dutch EU policy 
coordination, one interviewee commented along the lines of ‘we are optimistic that some 
pragmatic solutions will be found in the years to come’. This underlines the difference   15
between stressing integrated objectives politically and having a clue what multilevel 
organisational learning this requires.  
 
6 Conclusions 
 
The EU has made great strides in governance learning but has there been a governance turn 
and has this turn been successful? At a superficial level, the EU has witnessed a governance 
turn but this requires two qualifications. There has been considerable stability in the use of 
instruments and the results of the governance experiments have not been successful across the 
board. To place organisational learning in the context of governance learning, this article 
distinguished governance learning, instrument learning and organisational learning and 
assumed that these types of learning have to develop in parallel. Moreover, in the EU's 
multilevel context and depending on the instrument, organisational learning at the national 
level has to match the EU's capacity building.  
 
The first conclusion is that the Commission has shown considerable governance learning but 
not so much in terms of a paradigm shift towards new instruments but by making progress 
particularly with improving legislation. Secondly, in terms of instrument learning, the shares 
of networked-governance and legislation have remained stable. However, remarkable 
instrument learning has taken place through better planning and arguing new proposals. 
 
Thirdly, the case of better regulation, and focusing particularly on impact assessments, shows 
that instrument learning at EU level has been matched by considerable organisational learning 
in the form of additional bureaucratic, divisionalised, professional and horizontal coordination 
capacities.  
 
Fourthly, despite the country being a great supporter of better regulation, the Netherlands case 
reveals that similar organisational learning may not have taken place in the Council. The 
organisational learning tends towards a breakdown of the existing system.  
 
Finally, the Dutch BR agenda and related organisational learning have concentrated on Dutch 
policy making. The BR principles are not structurally incorporated into the Dutch positions 
defended in the Council. Hence, there are two incongruities: a mismatch between instrument 
learning and organisational learning, and a separation between national BR policy and the 
national EU policy coordination. If this can be generalised to the Council, this would explain 
lacking political attention for BR and lacking national input into Commission impact 
assessments. Hence, the Commission has a dilemma. It has made the necessary organisational 
adaptations but may now have to put on the agenda the - sensitive - question of how Member 
States prepare their negotiating positions. Insufficient connection between EU and national IA 
systems may explain the limited progress with EU IA systems. With these findings, the 
organisational model presented above proves to be useful to assess and compare 
organisational learning in the EU's multilevel administrative system. 
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Table 1 – Organisational learning in the context of governance learning 
Governance learning  Instrument learning (without being 
exhaustive) 
Organisational learning 
A deepening of each of 
the governance modes or 
an upgrade of these 
modes individually: 
- Markets 
(competition) 
- Networked-
governance 
(communication) 
- Hierarchies 
(coercion or 
legislation) 
 
Law 
-  Regulation as hierarchical 
steering  
-  Law as stick to support soft 
coordination 
-  Development of horizontal 
requirements for EU law as 
specified by the BR agenda 
(proofing, subsidiarity, 25% 
reduction of administrative 
costs, impact assessments, 
etc.) 
-  Planning, priority setting and 
budgeting 
 
Soft coordination 
-  OMC 
-  Steering through information 
 
Tax incentives, fiscal policy and 
budgets 
 
Agencies  
-  as independent regulatory 
authorities (e.g. the trade 
mark agency)  
-  as network organisations 
(e.g. the European 
Environment Agency) 
 
Hierarchy  
 
Bureaucratic capacities  
 
Standardisation of 
objectives 
 
Training 
 
Horizontal coordination 
mechanisms  
(informal relations, task 
forces, teams, integrating 
managers (with limited 
arbitration powers or with 
strong decision taking 
powers)) 
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Table 2 – the Commission’s BR-related organisational learning 
 
Hierarchy Bureaucracy  Management  by 
objective 
(divisionalisation)
Professional 
organisation 
Horizontal 
coordination 
Strong 
commitment 
and leadership 
from Barroso, 
the SG as well 
as from sector 
DGs  
SPP cycle 
 
Guidelines on 
IAs and how 
they are 
connected to the 
policy process 
(‘roadmaps’ etc) 
 
Regular 
evaluations 
 
SG: Elaboration 
of staff and 
powers 
 
Budgets for IAs 
 
Internet portal 
 
Obligation of DGs 
to carry out IAs 
and to create in-
house expertise  
Major training 
programmes 
Participation of 
the SG and 
Legal Service in 
interservice 
consultation 
(‘task forces’) 
 
Impact 
Assessment 
Board (a team 
chaired by the 
deputy SG as 
powerful 
integrating 
manager) 
 
IA working 
group 
 
Stoiber group 
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Table 3 – NL BR-related organisational learning (the weakening of the system in italics) 
 
Hierarchy Bureaucracy  Divisionalised 
organisation 
Professional 
organisation 
Horizontal 
coordination 
Strong political 
commitment for 
cost reduction 
(Cabinet level) 
 
Strong political 
leadership 
(Ministry of 
Finance). After 
2008 leadership 
seems to become 
more diffuse and 
cooperation to 
become 
voluntary 
 
ACTAL 
monitors 
administrative 
costs before 
legislation goes 
to parliament. 
The position of 
ACTAL is 
unclear in 
relation to 
integrated 
assessments 
 
Zero-base 
measurement as 
basis for the 
overall 
evaluation of 
achievements 
 
Elaboration of 
rules for 
integrated 
assessments 
25% reduction 
target with 
specification of 
targets per 
ministry. 
With the move 
towards 
integrated 
assessments, 
targets diversify 
and become 
more qualitative 
 
 
Training 
sessions on cost 
reduction 
Interministerial 
meeting 
coordinators for 
cost reduction 
(now also 
discussing 
developments 
towards IAs) 
 
 
 
 